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Abstract
To single one out of the innitely many, empirically indistin-
guishable gauge potentials of classical electrodynamics, and to
deem it more realthan the rest is not trivial. Only two routes
are open to one who might attempt to do so. The rst leads to a
slippery slope: if one singles out a potential solely by requiring it
to admit well behaved propagations, and on the strength of this
behavior one subscribes to its reality, one inevitably subscribes
to the reality of innitely many. As for the second, it seems to
be barred from the beginning. But if, for reasons of metaphysical
economy, one insisted on taking it, it would lead to a truncated
theorythat is physically and empirically inferior to the complete.
1 Introduction
From the revival of the Hole Argument we have learned that if a theory
involves a proliferation of in-principle unobservable yet regarded as real
entities, or if the time evolution of those entities is indeterministic, and
we attempt a literal interpretation of that theory, then we have gone
too far into the tangle of metaphysics. Classical electromagnetism is
a gauge theory that involves an innity of in-principle unobservable,
empirically indistinguishable, and, in a sense, mathematically equivalent
gauge potentials1. Endeavors to provide a literal interpretation of the
theory bring about both proliferation of unobservable but considered to
be real potentials, and indeterministic time evolution.
1Obviously, potentials that belong to di¤erent gauges di¤er from each other in that
they satisfy di¤erent dynamical equations. Yet, their gauge equivalence guarantees
that they yield the same electric and magnetic elds. This is su¢ cient for physicists
(Jackson among them) to proclaim them "fully equivalent" (2002, p.917).
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In a recent paper, Mattingly (2006) attempted to rid classical elec-
tromagnetism of its metaphysics by suggesting that we can distinguish
a particular potential, the so-called Liénard-Wiechert (LW potential
henceforth), and subscribe to its reality. With this move, he contends, we
make a metaphysical concession (like any other, the LW potential cannot
be observed independently of the electromagnetic eld-strengths), but
this is only a minimal price to pay because we gain a lot. Not only do
we "eliminate reference to gauge dependent quantities"2 (and thus avoid
both ontological proliferation and indeterminism3), but also we bring in
a causal imagery that accounts for e¤ects like the Aharonov-Bohm (A-
B henceforth)4. An inspired attempt no doubt, but more is required:
sound reasons that would validate the di¤erentiation of an unobservable
entity from an innity of observationally indistinguishable entities, and
would justify our insistence on its reality. Try as one might, I will argue,
it is impossible to nd any legitimate reasons for such a move.
To advance this argument, I will rst introduce the LW potential
along with a larger family of potentials, the -Lorenz, to which it be-
longs. While doing that, I will call attention to the fact that had we
dubbed realany of the -Lorenz potentials, we would have eliminated
reference to gauge dependent quantities, and we would have brought in
causal imagery similar to that a¤orded by the LW potential. Surely,
there are di¤erences between the LW potential and the rest: the latter
potential alone has components that propagate on the light cone only,
and this potential alone admits a manifestly Lorentz covariant expres-
sion. Yet, given their similarities, a question naturally arises: are these
di¤erences physically signicant? Or, put di¤erently, do these di¤er-
2Mattingly (2006), p. 250.
3Indeterminism in this case is brought about by gauge freedom. It is of a peculiar
kind and reminiscent of indeterminism in the hole argument. Roughly, the idea
why indeterminism is involved in this case is the following. Electromagnetic elds
propagate deterministically. Yet, gauge freedom allows us to choose, at any given
space-time point, any one of the innitely many potentials the theory permits. Thus,
propagation of potentials implicates indeterminism because we may begin with any
one of those potentials but, for no reason related to any causal interceptions, end up
with any other.
4To facilitate the reader who is not familiar with the A-B e¤ect, here is a summary
of it. Beam-electrons shot from an electron gun pass from two slits and end up on a
screen at some distance from the slits. On the screen they produce an interference
pattern. The interference pattern of the beam-electrons is shifted when a magnetic
eld is produced inside a solenoid that is located right outside and between the slits.
The peculiar thing about the e¤ect is that the wave-functions of the beam-electrons
do not interact with the magnetic eld, but, according to the mathematical theory
of the e¤ect, they couple with the so-called gauge potentials. It is important to note
that the magnetic eld is conned within the solenoid, and it is zero in all the regions
that are accessible to the beam-electrons.
2
ences su¢ ce to di¤erentiate the LW potential from the rest, and justify
ascription of reality to it alone? In general, the answer to this question
is negative, I will argue.
Then I will point out that if one insisted on ascribing reality to a
potential, only two routes would be open to them. On the rst route,
classical electrodynamics, with its gauge freedom and ontological com-
mitments, is taken for granted, but a potential is singled out and is
deemed more real than the rest. On the second route one assumes that
all electromagnetic e¤ects and interactions supervene on a unique po-
tential. The rst route leads to a slippery slope, I will insist. Since the
LW potentials special propagation characteristics and manifest Lorentz
covariance do not constitute adequate justication for ascription of re-
ality to it alone, if we insisted on its reality, we would be forced to
subscribe to the reality of the innitely many potentials of the -Lorenz
gauge. As for the second route, it seems to be blocked from the be-
ginning: since there is no di¤erence of physical signicance between the
LW potential and the rest of the -Lorenz gauge, ascription of reality to
the LW potential alone cannot be justied. Nonetheless, while on the
second route one could still appeal to reasons of metaphysical economy
and forge ahead. But then, I will show, one would also have to sacrice
part of the empirical content of the complete theory of electrodynamics.
2 Potentials
2.1 The Liénard-Wiechert Potential5
Begin with electric charges and currents, and the geometric structure of
Minkowski space-time. Assume that a kind of disturbanceor potential
will be produced by them and will propagate at the speed of light c. Us-
ing these elements only, dene or construct through an integral equation
the following 4-vector potential:
A(x) =
4
c
Z
d4x0Dr(x  x0)J(x0); (1)
where Dr(x  x0) the retarded Greens function
Dr(x  x0) = 1
2
(x0   x00)[(x  x0)2]; (2)
with propagation speed c. With  being the charges proper time, and
V () its four-velocity, the current J(x0) is dened by
J(x0) = ec
Z
dV ()(4)[x0   r()]; (3)
5The subsequent description of the LW potential relies on Jackson (1975).
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When  0 is dened by the light-cone condition [x   r( 0)]2 = 0, the
potential takes the form
A(x) =
eV ()
V  [x  r()] j=0 ; (4)
which is also known as the LW potential.
Obviously the LW potential represents a eld that emanates directly
from electric charges and currents, and propagates continuously in space-
time at the speed of light. It is related to the electromagnetic eld
strengths of classical electrodynamics through the equation
F = @A   @A; (5)
and one may go as far as to claim that the LW potential generates or
produces the eld strengths. Also, it couples directly with quantum
mechanically described charged elds, it is manifestly Lorentz covariant
and it is a quantity that is not manifestly U(1)-gauge dependent. Fi-
nally, once dened, its time evolution is determined. In short, it is a
mathematical entity that displays many of the characteristics one rou-
tinely associates with physical objects that causally a¤ect other physical
objects.
From a di¤erent perspective, the LW potential is merely one of the
innitely many gauge potentials of classical electrodynamics. It is the
solution to Maxwells equations in the Lorenz gauge, which is expressed
by the condition
@A
 = r A+ 1
c
@
@t
= 0: (6)
From this perspective, the LW potential is physically indistinguishable
from, and gauge equivalent to all the other gauge potentials that solve
Maxwells equations.
2.2 The  Lorenz Potentials6
Begin with electric charges and currents, and the geometric structure of
Minkowski space-time. Assume that a kind of disturbanceor potential
will be produced by them; certain of the components of this potential
will propagate at the speed of light c; while the propagation of the rest
will involve a speed c, where  is an arbitrary positive constant. Using
these elements only, dene or construct through integral equations scalar
6For the description of the  Lorenz potentials in this section I follow Brown &
Crothers (1989). The interested reader may also refer to Yang (1976) and Jackson
(2002), or Yang (2005) for the most recent exposition.
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and vector potentials as follows:
L(x; t) =
Z t1
t0
dt0
Z
V
d3x0G(x; tjcjx0; t0)(x0; t) (7)
and
AL(x; t) =
1
c
Z t1
to
dt0
Z
V
d3x0(x; tjjx0; t0)  J(x0; t): (8)
G(x; tjcjx0; t0) is a scalar Greens function with propagation speed c,
while (x; tjjx0; t0) is a vector Greens function, and (x0; t) and J(x0; t)
are the charge and current densities respectively. The vector Greens
function can be resolved into two components:
(x; tjjx0; t0) = (x; tjcjx0; t0) + ~(x; tjjx0; t0); (9)
the rst of which propagates at c, while the propagation speed of the
second is not xed7.The second component, however, can be rewritten as
a product of two propagators, one corresponding to propagation speed
c and another corresponding to propagation speed c8. Substituting (9)
into (8) we get
AL(x; t)=
1
c
Z t1
to
dt0
Z
V
d3x0(x; tjcjx0; t0)  J(x0; t) +
+
1
c
Z t1
to
dt0
Z
V
d3x0 ~(x; tjjx0; t0)  J(x0; t): (10)
The potentials given by (7) and (10) are called  Lorenz potentials9.
Obviously the -Lorenz potentials represent elds that emanate di-
rectly from electric charges and currents, whose various components
propagate continuously in space-time. The scalar component, described
by equation (7), propagates at speed c, but its vector part, described by
equation (10), has two components: the rst propagates at the speed of
light, whereas the second "propagates like an expanding smoke-ring"10.
7This is precisely the meaning of the double line in ~(x; tjjx0; t0).
8Yang (2005) gives an explicit expression of ~(x; tjjx0; t0) in terms of Greens
functions, c and c; namely
R
d3x00dt00G(x; tjcjx00; t00)G(x00; tjcjx0; t) (equation 3.33,
with v = c).
9Some (e.g. Jackson (2002), Yang (2005)) also call them the potentials of the
velocity or v-gauge.
10Brown & Crothers (1986, p.2955). The details of the propagation of the second
component of the -Lorenz potentials vector part depend on whether  < 1 or
> 1. In the rst case the outer boundary propagates at the speed of light and the
inner at speed c, whereas in the second the speeds are reversed. In either case, the
second part of the vector-component spreads in space-time in a way similar to that
of expanding smoke-rings.
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The fact that  is an arbitrary positive constant allows for the propaga-
tion speeds of those components to di¤er from almost zero, to equal
to that of light, to as fast as almost instantaneous11. However, for
0 <   1, all components are either c-retarded or c-retarded; that
is, they propagate continuously and at speeds that do not violate any
special relativistic or causal requirements. Thus, they too display the
essential characteristics one routinely associates with physical objects
that causally a¤ect other physical objects.
Like the LW potential, the potentials of (7) and (10) are related to
the electromagnetic eld-strengths through the equations
E(x; t) =  rL(x; t) 
1
c
@
@t
AL(x; t) (11)
and
B(x; t) =rAL(x; t): (12)
Also, like the LW potential, they couple directly with quantum mechan-
ically described charged elds, and they are not manifestly U(1)-gauge
dependent. Finally, unlike the LW potential, they lack manifest Lorentz
covariance; but as we shall see shortly, this di¤erence turns out to be
irrelevant to any arguments a propos the alleged reality of any of them.
From a di¤erent perspective, the potentials of (7) and (10) are merely
solutions to Maxwells equations12 in the so-called  Lorenz gauge,
which is expressed by the condition
r AL + 1
2c
@L
@t
= 0: (13)
From this perspective, then, the -Lorenz potentials are innitely many
physically indistinguishable from and gauge equivalent to all the other
potentials that solve Maxwells equations.
3 Potential candidates for reality
If one insisted that gauge potentials must be interpreted realistically,
what justication would be needed for attributing reality to one or more
of the potentials introduced above? And if more than one potential t
the bill, would it still be possible to argue on physically relevant grounds
that only one among them is truly the real one? Even if the answer to
11Note that for  = 1 the resulting potential is no other than the LW. It is also
worth pointing out that at the limit !1, the resulting potential is no other than
the Coulomb.
12The proof of this fact is far from trivial. The interested reader may refer to Yang
(1976, 2002) and Brown & Crothers (1989) for detailed proofs and further discussion.
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the rst question turned out to be yes, I am positive that the second
question would have to be answered in the negative.
In attributing reality to mathematical entities, the rst considera-
tion one usually takes into account is observational evidence. Given
that no potential can be observed independently of eld-strengths, and
that there are innitely many potentials which yield the exact same elec-
tromagnetic observables, there are no empirical means which we might
use in order to distinguish any one of them from any other. Focusing on
the potentials of the -Lorenz gauge that I introduced above, the unob-
servability of the potentials entails that no matter what the value of 13,
the parts of the potentials whose propagation speed di¤ers from that of
light do not a¤ect the observables of electromagnetism. Roughly and
qualitatively speaking14, gauge covariance guarantees that contributions
from these parts cancel out, and in the end the resulting electromag-
netic observables are independent of . Thus, if the decision had to be
grounded on empirical considerations, dubbing one potential realwould
be tantamount to dubbing them all real.
Since appeal to directly observable and measurable properties is of
no use, other means must be employed. This, however, entails that the
kind of reality to be appealed to is, in a sense, weaker than the real-
ity attributed to mathematical expressions, e.g. spinors, which describe
actual observable entities, e.g. electrons. In the case of electrons, the
correspondence between theoretical and physical entities is straightfor-
ward; in the case of potentials it is not. For this reason, arguments in
favor of an interpretation of gauge potentials as real causally e¢ cacious
objects can only be a posteriori and rely on indirect evidence.
The argument that I am challenging in this paper rests on the fol-
lowing idea. If through "non-arbitrary analysis of what is real in a world
accurately described by classical electrodynamics"15 we manage to nd
a unique potential, which is "purely intrinsically and locally denable
in terms only of the charge and the geometric structure of spacetime"16,
this potential must correspond to the reality underlying electromagnetic
e¤ects like the A-B. This, I take it, means that a potential must be den-
able (or constructible) not through Maxwells di¤erential equations, but
through formulae involving only charge distribution and the structure of
13Since gauge potentials are not observable, all the potentials of the -Lorenz gauge
could be included in the present discussion; the propagation speed of the observables
would always be within the limits set by Einsteins principle of light.
14Once again, I refer the interested reader to the aforementioned references for
detailed proofs and further discussion.
15Mattingly (2006), p. 251.
16Op. cit.
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space-time17. The mathematical entities that enter the denition or con-
struction of the potential must correspond directly to physical entities
or quantities that are locally denable18 and propagate in accordance
with causal requisites, i.e. continuously and at speeds less than or at
most equal to the speed of light.
The potential that is thus constructed must too be locally den-
able, and propagate in accordance with causal requisites; thus there is
no room for instantaneous propagation. But in addition, this potential
must be non-gauge-dependent, propagate deterministically and be com-
patible with special relativity and quantum mechanics in all respects.
Since the constraints of special relativity dictate that real objects propa-
gate continuously and at speeds that do not exceed the speed of light, the
theoretical description of any purportedly real potential must be so con-
strained too. Finally, the mathematical expression of the potential must
not violate the theorys Lorentz covariance, and it must allow for quan-
tization. With the requirements in place, and, consequently, restricting
our attention to potentials of the -Lorenz gauge with 0 <   119, the
question that opened this section becomes: among these potentials, are
there any that fulll all these requirements?
For the denition or construction of the LW potential and the other
potentials of the -Lorenz gauge, one uses charge and current distribu-
tions, and the structure of space-time alone. The components of each
potential, LW or otherwise, emanate directly from charges and propagate
continuously at nite luminal or sub-luminal speeds. Thus the behav-
ior of any potential in  Lorenz gauge is in accordance with what we
might call perfectly acceptable causal requirements. Moreover, each
of these potentials is manifestly gauge-independent and it propagates
deterministically.
At rst glance, though, the LW potential seems to be privileged in
that all its components propagate on the light-cone, and therefore its
propagation speed is invariant, whereas the propagation speed of the
components of the other -Lorenz gauge potentials is explicitly frame-
depenendent. In addition, the LW potential is also unique in that its
17Assumed throughout to be Minkowski.
18I take it that locally denable objects may be localized, but they may also be
spatially extended.
19In what follows, I limit my discussion to 0 <   1: This restriction does not in
any way a¤ect what I have to say about the -Lorenz potentials from now on, and
it will not allow our attention to be diverted to issues that are not directly relevant
to my argument. The reader who is interested in these issues may refer to Yang &
Kobe (1986) and Yang (2002).
Thus, from now on, -Lorenz gaugemeans restricted -Lorenz gauge with 0 <
  1.
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mathematical expression is manifestly Lorentz covariant. This implies
that so far as the LW potential is concerned, Lorentz covariance of the
theory is guaranteed and so is its quantization. Hence, among the po-
tentials of the  Lorenz gauge only the LW potential appears to fulll
all the requirements we imposed.
I argue, however, that the characteristics which are unique to the LW
potential do not constitute di¤erences of physical signicance. Therefore,
on the proviso that my claim is well-substantiated, it follows that if one
insisted on interpreting the LW potential as realjust because it fullls
these requirements, one would have to interpret as real the innitely
many potentials of the -Lorenz gauge as well. Let us turn to all the
challenges my claim must meet, one at a time.
3.1 The insignicance of the speed of light
To begin with, let us muse over the di¤erence in propagation speeds.
By itself, the fact that -Lorenz potentials with  6= 1 have compo-
nents whose propagation speeds di¤er from that of light is irrelevant to
questions concerning their reality. Given the invariance of the speed of
light in special relativity, one might be tempted to press that this is the
only real speedallowed for by the theory. By the same token, since
the propagation speed of the LW potential is equal to that of light, one
might argue that if a potential were real, the LW potential must be it.
The fact of the matter, however, is that this idea is misguided. For,
consider an observable actual particle, or a collection of such particles20.
More likely than not, their speeds with respect to any inertial frame are
slower than that of light, and therefore not Lorentz invariant. In this
case, even if one asserted that the only realspeed in special relativity is
the speed of light, one would be hard pressed to argue against the reality
of the actual moving particles and ground their argument on the non-
reality of their speed. Thus, the fact that the exact value of c Lorenz
is always frame-dependent for  6= 1 cannot and does not render them
less real than light, for the same reason that frame-dependence of the
speed of an actual particle cannot and does not render it less real than
light.
Obviously the analogy is not exact. Particles are not only observ-
able but also causally e¢ cacious beyond reasonable doubt, and their
time-evolution is xed. Gauge potentials, on the other hand, are not
independently observable and the indeterminism associated with them
is of a peculiar kind that surpasses even quantum indeterminism. As for
their causal e¢ cacy, it is under consideration and we may or may not be
20To avoid complications that are not relevant to the argument here, consider these
particles to behave classically.
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able to establish it beyond reasonable doubt. But assume for the sake of
the argument that potentials were causally e¢ cacious objects; the fact
that some parts of some of them would propagate at a non-invariant
speed could not and would not entail that they are less real than the
ones propagating at the invariant speed of light. Therefore, despite the
fact that the description of the propagation of particular potentials in
the -Lorenz gauge requires the additional structure of inertial frames,
our analogy guarantees that the di¤erence is irrelevant to the question
of their reality21.
Insisting on the di¤erence between the propagations speeds, one
might still object that since the exact value of  is inertial-frame-dependent,
more than the generic structure of Minkowski space-time is required for
the construction of the -Lorenz potentials with  6= 1. On the other
hand, they might urge, since the propagation speed of the LW poten-
tials components is the same with that of light, only the LW potential
and this alone can be dened or constructed without appeal to inertial
frames. Therefore, they would conclude, only the LW potential meets
all the conditions that are necessary for reality.
I believe that this kind of argument is based on a negligence. Without
doubt, the exact value of , which appears explicitly in equations (7) and
(10), can only be given relative to an inertial frame. For this reason, the
exact description of the propagation of the components of any particular
potential in the  -Lorenz gauge (for  6= 1) requires more than the
generic structure of space-time: it requires the structure associated with
particular inertial frames. But so does the description of the exact form
of the individual components of the LW potential. Let me explain.
The LW potential is not an invariant of special relativity. Rather,
its form is that of a four-vector, as is the form of the charge/current
density that appears in equation (1), and of the velocity that appears
in equation (4). Their Lorentz covariant formulation implies that the
exact values of each of their four components depend on our point of
view; that is, they depend on inertial frames.
To clarify this point further, consider the expression of the component
A, given by equation (4). This is proportional to V , the corresponding
component of the charges four-velocity. But four-velocity is Lorentz
covariant, and thus the actual value of each of its components is inertial-
frame-dependent too. This shows that the frame-dependence of the exact
value of  might constitute an argument against the reality of the  -
21Note, for later convenience, that one might argue that if gauge potentials are the
reality underlying electromagnetic e¤ects, they should propagate like light. However,
I believe that whether this contention is legitimate or not depends on ones ontological
commitments. For this reason I postpone its discussion until the next section.
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Lorenz potentials (with  6= 1) as much as the frame-dependence of the
exact value of V . If one of them is not real, neither is the other, and
vice-versa.
3.2 Lorentz covariance and its signicance
A plausible objection that could be raise is that the fact that the overall
expression of the LWpotential is manifestly Lorentz covariant still counts
as a di¤erence of physical signicance; for, rst of all, it renders it the
only potential that is "uniquely" denable in terms of charge and the
generic structure of space-time alone. Strictly speaking, of course, the
only uniquely denable quantities of a covariant theory are its invariants.
Yet, manifest Lorentz covariance guarantees that the overall form of four-
vectors or higher order tensors is the same in all inertial frames. Thus,
they too may be thought of as uniquely denable in the sense that once
dened, their form remains invariant under Lorentz transformations.
On the other hand, one may insist, the overall expression of the
other -Lorenz potentials is not Lorentz covariant and, therefore, explicit
appeal to an inertial frame is necessary to even formulate equations (7)
and (10). This is as good indication as any that the LW potential is
the only one which is dened or constructed once and for all; whereas
the other -Lorenz potentials need to be re-dened or re-constructed on
each specic inertial frame from scratch.
In e¤ect, however, the form of equations (7) and (10) is ultimately
frame-independent too. The fact that their specic form is acquired only
relative to a specic frame is in exact analogy to the fact that the exact
value of, say, the velocity of a point-particle can be specied only relative
to an inertial frame. In the same way that no one specic inertial frame
is required for the denition or construction of the generic form of a
particles four-velocity, no such frame is required for the construction or
denition of the scalar potential in (7) or the vector potential in (10)
either.
To understand why this is the case, consider the -Lorenz gauge
condition (13). This can be generalized as follows22:
G@A
L
 = 0; (14)
where G is any 4  4 matrix, @ is the usual derivative in Minkowski
space-time, and AL = (
1
2
L;AL). This generalization brings to light
the fact that -Lorenz potentials constitute a Lorentz invariant class.
This, in turn, entails that Lorentz transformations map -Lorenz po-
tentials onto other -Lorenz potentials. Thus, once -Lorenz potentials
22For this formulation I am indebted to the Editor of this journal, Professor t
Hooft.
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have been dened, through equations (7) and (10), they have been speci-
ed for all inertial observers and no more than the generic characteristics
of space-time are required in order to identify their form in any inertial
frame.
To leave no doubt that this indeed is the case, and to relate equations
to the desired causal imagery, let us make the same point using a more
familiar expression of equation (14). We may express equation (13) in a
particular inertial frame, say K 0, as follows23:
r0 A0L +
1
2c
@0L
@t0
= 0: (15)
Taking the time-like unit vector in K 0 to be n0 = (1;o), equation (15)
can be rewritten as
r0 A0L +
1
2c
(n0@
0)(n0A
0) = 0; (16)
and therefore as
@0A
0 + (
1
2c
  1)(n0@0)(n0A0) = 0: (17)
Equation (17) is generally covariant; thus in a frame K, with time-like
unit vector n = (; ), it becomes:
@A
 + (
1
2c
  1)(n@)(nA) = 0; (18)
where A is simply the usual Lorentz-transformed A024. This goes to
show that once we acquire the explicit form of an -Lorenz potential in
any particular inertial frame, we can deduce its form in any other inertial
frame using only the Lorentz transformation properties of four-vectors.
This is exactly what happens with four-vectors, in general, and the LW
potential in particular. Namely, once we acquire its explicit form in any
particular inertial frame, we can deduce in any other inertial frame using
only the Lorentz transformation properties of four-vectors. Therefore,
equations (7) and (10) do not require reference to any particular inertial
frame, and they are, in e¤ect, frame independent.
Returning to the causal imagery, the meaning of the preceding dis-
cussion is that if gauge potentials were causally e¢ cacious and observ-
able objects, what would appear as an -Lorenz potential in one inertial
frame would also appear as an -Lorenz potential in any other, albeit
23For this approach I am grateful to Professor J. D. Jackson.
24Note, for later convenience, that in this case we can, and do, treat gauge poten-
tials as four-vectors.
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with di¤erent propagation characteristics. The scalar component, origi-
nally given by equation (7), will still be retarded, but the actual value of
its propagation speed will most likely be di¤erent; so will the second part
of the vector component, originally given by equation (10). The exact
form and propagation speed of these components depends, of course, on
their initial form and propagation speed. But the fact of the matter is
that they can be found using a manifestly Lorentz covariant equation,
equation (18), and the usual Lorentz transformation of four-vectors, no
more.
Reiterating my previous example, the situation here is no di¤erent
from the situation of a quantity like the four-velocity of, say, a point-
particle. As with -Lorenz potentials, to dene this quantity there is no
need to appeal to any one inertial frame in particular. Yet again, as with
-Lorenz potentials, the specic values of the components of that four-
velocity can only be obtained relative to a specic inertial frame. Under
Lorentz transformations the components of the four-velocity will change
in the way components of vectors change; but also, in the case of the
-Lorenz potentials the components will change in a way dictated by a
Lorentz covariant equation. So, really, -Lorenz potentials only behave
in a way analogous to that of a "uniquely" denable quantity. The only
di¤erence between them is that whereas the "uniquely" denable four-
velocity transforms like a four-vector under Lorentz transformations, -
Lorenz potentials follow a more complicated transformation rule. But
again, this is the most one can expect from compound objects that do
not propagate at the speed of light.
Naturally, the question arises: even if the previous objection is over-
come, isnt manifest Lorentz covariance per se physically signicant?
After all, one may rightly claim, the mathematical expression of phys-
ically signicant entities is usually of that type. In addition, and most
decisively, Lorentz covariance of the entire theory is also at stake. Man-
ifest Lorentz covariance of these expressions is therefore essential for
methodological reasons, even if not for ascription of reality. My an-
swer, of course, is that no, the physical signicance of manifest Lorentz
covariance cannot be thus supported, and here are the reasons.
To answer the rst complaint rst, it is true that in theories which
admit special relativistic formulation the mathematical expressions of
physically signicant objects, entities and quantities are usually mani-
festly Lorentz covariant. In other words, the mathematical expressions
of these objects, etc. usually take the form of invariants, four-vectors
or higher-order tensors. An example of a manifestly Lorentz covariant
object is provided by the electromagnetic eld-strengths. On the other
hand, these theories may also involve objects, etc. whose mathematical
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expressions are given relative to an inertial frame. A typical example of
a non-covariant quantity is three-velocity.
But the idea that real objects, etc. can be represented only by man-
ifestly Lorentz covariant expressions is misguided. To begin with, man-
ifest Lorentz covariance is not su¢ cient for reality. One may combine
physically signicant scalars and tensors of a theory to successfully con-
struct manifestly Lorentz covariant expressions with no physical coun-
terparts or interpretations. Moreover, manifest Lorentz covariance is not
necessary either. There exist quantities (like the three-velocity itself or
the height of a building or the electric eld relative to the lab) which,
though not manifestly Lorentz covariant, admit a physical and often
realistic interpretation.
One might object, of course, that all the aforementioned quantities
can be expressed in terms of covariant quantities: four-velocity, four-
vector and the electromagnetic-eld-tensor respectively. Hence, since
physically signicant objects etc. can be expressed in some Lorentz
covariant form or another, the mathematical expressions of all physically
signicant objects etc. must be expressible in covariant form too. In
this manner, by using the fact that the LW potential is the only one
among the -Lorenz potentials that is manifestly Lorentz covariant, one
might advance the case of its reality. But this would be, at best, a weak
argument from necessity (which could not secure reality), or, at worse,
an argument involving an unwarranted leap from canto must. I am
afraid that the latter is the case.
In order to get my point across, let us consider the following example.
Assume that the object of our interest is an arbitrary distribution of light
and matter. The result of a Lorentz transformation would be yet another
distribution where photons still move at the speed of light, but material
particles move at speeds di¤erent from their original ones. Assuming
that the Lorentz transformation rule for the shape of the entire distrib-
ution could be found, it would be very surprising if it turned out to be
anything like a tensor transformation rule. And yet, it is preposterous
to claim that the distribution is not real just because its mathematical
description does not transform like a tensor under Lorentz transforma-
tions. Along the same lines, it would be preposterous to claim that a
theoretical entity, like a gauge potential, cannot represent a real object
just because its expression is not manifestly Lorentz covariant; and it
would be unwarranted to claim that a potential is real just because its
expression is.
A plausible response is that a distribution can be perceived of as
a conglomeration of objects, ideally elementary, whose mathematical
descriptions are necessarily Lorentz covariant. Thus the point is not
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whether there exist compound objects whose description is not mani-
festly Lorentz covariant; rather, the point is what happens when funda-
mental objects are concerned. When it comes to that, although man-
ifest Lorentz covariance may not to be necessary, strictly speaking, it
may still be desirable as a methodological constraint. Put di¤erently,
manifest Lorentz covariance of mathematical expressions of objects etc.
is physically signicant because it safeguards the Lorentz covariance of
the theory as a whole.
The requirement for Lorentz covariance of theories, however, is rather
subtle. For this reason, before I tackle this last objection, I have to rst
say a few things in order to clarify the meaning and implications of the
requirement of Lorentz covariance.
When the relation between Lorentz covariance of a theory and man-
ifest Lorentz covariance of expressions in it is examined, sometimes a
mistaken conation of the two notions takes place. What is really at
stake is the entire theorys Lorentz covariance. Thus relevant question
is not whether the theoretical description of its objects is manifestly
Lorentz covariant. Rather, the pertinent question is whether lack of
manifest Lorentz covariance in the theoretical description of these ob-
jects jeopardizes the overall covariance, the covariance of the theory as
a whole. The answer, of course, is no, it does not.
In general, although manifest Lorentz covariance of the expressions
of a theory guarantees the covariance of the theory as a whole, lack
of manifest Lorentz covariance of certain expressions does not always
destroy the theorys covariance. When it comes to gauge potentials, their
general behavior under Lorentz transformations is idiosyncratic, yet well
documented. The potentials of the Lorenz gauge, and therefore the LW
potential, behave like four-vectors. All other potentials do not. But the
generic form of their Lorentz transformations is such that the theorys
Lorentz covariance is guaranteed25. There is an extensive literature on
the issue, and the conclusion, time and again, has been that the lack
of manifest Lorentz covariance of di¤erent gauges does not a¤ect the
covariance of the theory as a whole26. The lack of manifest Lorentz
covariance of the -Lorenz potentials is no di¤erent, but let me persist
on this point a little longer.
When certain non-covariant but physically signicant entities appear
in a theory, there is only one way to tell whether their lack of manifest
25For a general account of the general behavior of gauge potentials under Lorentz
transformations, the interested reader may refer to Bjorken & Drell (1965), especially
pp. 73-4.
26For further reinforcment of this point, the interested reader may refer to the
literature re the Coulomb gauge. See, for example, Zumino (1970) and France (1976).
15
Lorentz covariance is undesirable: by examining the impact of this de-
ciency on the observable implications of the theory. In the case at hand,
manifest Lorentz covariance would not only be desirable, but it would
be required only if its absence entailed observational or physical incon-
sistencies. Such inconsistencies would be signaled either by dependence
of the resulting classical observables on the arbitrary constant , or by
a failure to formulate quantum electrodynamics (QED) in that gauge.
Classical electromagnetisms gauge covariance guarantees that the
observables of the theory are the same, no matter what the gauge po-
tentials. Therefore, the acid test in this case is provided by quantum
theory, and the question that determines the fate of -Lorenz potentials
with  6= 1 is: does the explicit dependence of the potentials on  destroy
the possibility for quantization? If it did, the potentials of the -Lorenz
gauge would destroy the theorys Lorentz covariance as well; but if it
did not they would not. In 1990 Baxter presented a self-consistent for-
mulation of QED in the -Lorenz gauge, and proved that the quantum
observables resulting from it do not depend on  either. Thus, in the
case at hand, not only is the requirement for manifest Lorentz covariance
dispensable, but also its alleged desirability is not justied by appeal to
the Lorentz covariance of the theory as a whole.
3.3 Candidates for reality
Before I turn to the main argument of this paper, a summary of the
conclusions I have already established is in order. I begun this sec-
tion by asking two questions. The rst concerned the justication that
would be required for attributing reality to one or more of the -Lorenz
gauge potentials. Since one cannot appeal to their observability, if, for
other reasons, one felt compelled to attribute reality to them, one would
have to examine whether there are any among them that behave like
real causally e¢ cacious objects. The requirements one may come up
with cannot establish reality, but at least one may argue that they are
necessary.
Restricting my attention to potentials in the -Lorenz gauge with
0 <   1, I have shown that there are innitely many potentials from
which one might choose. All of them emanate directly from charges, are
dened or constructed using charge/current distributions and the struc-
ture of Minkowski space-time alone, and propagate in accordance with
constraints imposed by both special relativity and causal considerations.
I have also shown that despite the fact that only one among them, the
LWpotential, is expressed in manifestly Lorentz covariant form, manifest
Lorentz covariance is relevant to its uniqueness only, but not to any
claims about its reality. Put di¤erently, notwithstanding its uniqueness,
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the LW potential has no more realattributes than the other potentials
in the -Lorenz gauge. Since more than one potential ts the bill, the
second question is answered in the negative: it is not possible to argue
on physically relevant grounds that only one among them is the real
one. For this reason, adherence to the idea that one of them must be
real would amount to no more than an arbitrary choice of some specic
value for , which would be as good (or as bad) as the choice of any
other value.
4 Two routes
The classical theory of electrodynamics involves an innity of unobserv-
able gauge potentials, which constitute what has become known as its
surplus structure. For almost a century, from Maxwells formulation of
the theory until the late 1950s, potentials were considered to be mere
mathematical artifacts. The discovery of the A-B e¤ect, however, sig-
naled a change. In the paper that heralded the e¤ect27, Aharonov and
Bohm showed that, after all, potentials are physically signicant. For
this reason, they claimed, a di¤erent interpretation of the electromag-
netic potentials and their role in the theory was required. But they
hastily suggested a literal reading of the entire theory; a suggestion that
opened Pandoras box of interpretational metaphysics, indeterminism
and a long debate.
The debate concerning the status of gauge potentials rests mostly
on an interpretive dilemma. Either electrodynamics describes a world
of elds, and eld is all there is; but then our theory falls prey to un-
mediated action at a distance28. Or we embrace locality, granted by
unobservable potentials29, and along with it a literal interpretation of
the theory; but then electrodynamics becomes a theory involving heavy
metaphysics30 and a vicious kind of indeterminism31.
In the literature, both physics and philosophical, there have been
27Aharonov & Bohm (1959).
28I use here the term un-mediatedto denote that the action at a distance involved
in e¤ects like the A-B is worse than, say, the more familiar Newtonian version. In
the former we deal with e¤ects of zero-valued forces. In the latter we deal with forces
that are non-zero but are dened simultaneously throughout space.
29Note in passing that the locality granted by potentials in general is of a kind that
one might call the locality of being there. The fact that some of these potentials
(i.e. of the Coulomb gauge) propagate instantaneously indicates clearly that this
kind of locality does not necessarily involve what one might consider as continuous
causal propagation.
30That is, innitely many, empirically indistiguishable gauge potentials that cor-
respond to a single set of covariant values of the observable electromagnetic eld.
31See footnote 3 for a clarication about the kind of indeterminism involved.
17
various responses, Mattinglys (2006) being the latest. In it he suggests
that it is possible to resolve the dilemma by recognizing "the primary role
that current plays in the A-B e¤ect and replace our di¤erential equation,
B =rA, for the vector potential with the sum over denite integrals
that expresses a eld arising from the current itself"32. Once we have
recognized the role of that integral, he claims, "we can, if we like, view
it as the "reality" underlying"33 electromagnetic e¤ects like the A-B.
The only problem with ascribing reality to that integral is that being
merely an expression of a particular gauge potential, the Lorenz, it can
never be observed independently of the eld-strengths associated with it.
However, the cost is minimal, in his view, because we are compensated
generously by metaphysical economy (only one unobservable real entity
as opposed to innitely many) and explanatory power (a real object as
the cause of the A-B e¤ect).
Though well intended and compelling, the motivation for this move
(i.e. gains from it) is hardly enough. The combination of the mathemat-
ical indistinguishability of the potentials in the context of electrodynam-
ics34 with their unobservability implies that there are no a priori reasons
to single out one; neither observational nor theoretical arguments suf-
ce. The gains from choosing one would be the same with those from
choosing almost any other. So, really, the signicant question is: on
what grounds can we pick one among them? Or, in other words, how
can we justify the choice of the LW potential?
Were we to interpret gauge potentials realistically and avoid the
metaphysical ination that accompanies electromagnetisms gauge free-
dom, in general only two routes would be open.
On the rst route one accepts electromagnetism as we know it but
maintains that there exists a unique, real gauge potential which underlies
at least some parts of the reality described by the theory. In other
words, one is committed to the reality of elds as independent entities,
but one also claims that at the same time there exists a single real
potential that underlies electromagnetic e¤ects like the A-B, for which
the elds alone cannot account. Thus, in this case, one is committed
to both the ontology of electrodynamics, modulo gauge potentials, and
the reality of a single gauge potential. The problem with this turn, and
therefore with the route it leads to, is that one must provide compelling
reasons for singling out one gauge potential. Or else, the interpretation
o¤ered by this route would be no di¤erent from the ontology o¤ered by
the literal interpretation; for, subscribing to the reality of one potential
32Mattingly (2006), p.250.
33Op. cit., p. 251.
34See footnote 1.
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would entail subscribing to the reality of more, and therefore not only the
metaphysical economy of the suggested solution would be blown away,
but also indeterminism would sneak back.
On the second route one takes ones commitment to the reality of
gauge potentials a step further: one asserts that all electromagnetic
phenomena are epiphenomena, which transpire only as a result of the
existence of a single potential. To use a philosophically loaded word, this
amounts to the assertion that all electromagnetic phenomena supervene
on that potential. Again, a unique potential must be singled out, or
else the metaphysical ination associated with the literal interpretation
wont be diminished. But providing compelling arguments for uniqueness
is only the rst hurdle on the second route. Given its stricter ontological
commitment, the complete theorys gauge freedom is abolished on the
second route and one ends up with a truncated theory. The downside
of such a radical move is that one has to show that the new truncated
theory is empirically equivalent to the old one. Or else one would trade
empirical content for metaphysical economy, and this is a price to high
to pay.
So far as I understand him, Mattingly is not clear regarding the route
that he is willing to (and does) follow. Although he seems to assert that
the second route is to be taken35, as a matter of fact his central argument
for the reality of the LW potential appears to proceed on the course of
the rst36. By proposing the second route, I may therefore be accused
for stretching Mattinglys argument to the breaking point. My aim in
what follows, however, is not only to rebut Mattinglys argument, but
also to show that all possible attempts to argue for the reality of the LW
potential are untenable.
Let us now explore these two routes.
35At least this is how I understand the following assertion. He asks what might
have been the reason why all gauge potentials were considered to be important in
understanding the ontology of electrodynamics. His response: "a rough and ready
answer is that because of an accident of history that dened the vector potential
as any eld A satisfying r  A = B, and therefore originally masking its [the
LW potentials] reality, we were unable to see that just one member of the family [of
gauge potentials] is numerically identical to a real, causally e¢ cacious, non-arbitrary,
local quantity" (p.252). In other words, he seems to assert that the potential has
ontological primacy over the elds.
36Or at least this is how I understand his assertion that "only the LW potential of a
single charge arises from a non-arbitrary analysis of what is real in a world accurately
described by classical electrodynamics" (p. 251). In other words, here he seems to
have taken the complete theory of classical electrodynamics for granted, which leaves
open to him only the rst route.
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4.1 Slippery slope
In taking this route one accepts that the world is accurately described
by classical electrodynamics and its unavoidable gauge covariance. Yet,
without being inconsistent, one may still claim that, against the theorys
odds, just one among the innitely many, in-principle unobservable, and
thus indistinguishable gauge potentials is "the true vector potential".
One may insist further that this is the only potential that underlies elec-
tromagnetic e¤ects; at least those that are due to charges and currents37.
Given its agreeable characteristics, the LW potential presents itself
as a good candidate. After all, it is dened through an integral equation
that involves only physical quantities, and its four-vector form is man-
ifestly Lorentz covariant. What is more, it does not depend explicitly
on gauge-dependent quantities and its time evolution is deterministic.
Hence it does have certain characteristics that physical objects have.
Surely, this is a case where having those appropriate characteristics
amounts to having characteristics that are necessary for reality but not
su¢ cient: observability is missing and will always be missing from the
list. Claiming that the LW potential is real merely because it has some
necessary characteristics would, therefore, beg the question. Something
more is needed. To ll this gap, Mattingly asserts that the LW potential
is the only one that "does not require non-local specications"38, but
instead it propagates causally from the source-charges to the space-time
regions where it may interact with other charges or elds. By this, I
take it, he means the following.
Assuming a special relativistic world, one expects electromagnetic
waves and interactions to propagate at the speed of light. Yet, potentials
that result from arbitrary gauge choices have components that require
"non-local assignment[s] of values to points in space-time"39. The ex-
ample he refers to is the scalar potential in the Coulomb gauge, which
appears to propagate at an innite speed: it spreads throughout space
instantaneously. The observable electromagnetic elds that result from
this potential propagate of course at the speed of light. But in order
for the elds to do so, the contribution of the scalar component must be
cancelled out by another factor: the contribution of the transverse part
37This way one avoids the thorny issue of plane electromagnetic waves, which can-
not be recovered by retarded potentials in general and the LW potential in particular.
Retarded potentials are solutions to Maxwell equations in the presence of charges,
while plane waves are solutions to Maxwell equations in the absence of charges. The
implication of this di¤erence is that plane waves are not part of a world described by
the LW potential.
38Op. cit., p.252.
39Op. cit. p. 251.
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of the vector current, which is produced by the source-charges, and prop-
agates instantaneously too. Hence, in the case of the Coulomb gauge, an
instantaneous (or non-local as Mattingly prefers to call it) e¤ect is ren-
dered harmless only because it is cancelled out by another instantaneous
(or non-local) e¤ect.
Similarly, the argument goes, in all other gauges except the Lorenz,
instantaneous (or non-local) specications are also required in order to
reinstate propagation of elds at the speed of light. Given that Mattingly
is "unaware of any other "gauge" that involves neither extra geometric
structure that is not part of Minkowski space nor a non-local assignment
of values to points in spacetime"40, he concludes that the Lorenz gauge,
or the resulting LW potential for that matter, is unique. Therefore the
LW potential can be singled out and viewed as the reality underlying
electromagnetic e¤ects and phenomena that are due to charges and cur-
rents.
But being unaware of the existence of other potentials that are both
"purely intrinsically and locally denable in terms only of the charge
and the geometric structure of spacetime"41, and such that they do not
"involve non-local specications from the very beginning in order to be
themselves denable", is hardly a proof that such potentials do not exist.
In fact, the existence of the  Lorenz gauge shows that there is a whole
family of potentials, innitely many if truth be told, that have the exact
same characteristics which might render the LW potential "unique" and
therefore real.
The entire family of the  Lorenz potentials with 0 <  < 1 are
dened intrinsically and locally, in terms only of the charge and the geo-
metric structure of space-time, and no potential in that family involves
super-luminal, or, even worse, instantaneous propagations in order to be
so dened. From their specic descriptions42 it is clear that their com-
ponents propagate continuously and at luminal or sub-luminal speeds.
Therefore, if we assumed them to be independent objects in their own
right, they would propagate continuously from the sources from which
they emanate, and they would a¤ect other charges or elds in c-retarded
or c-retarded manner. For these reasons they could be considered to
be as causally e¢ cacious as their  = 1 counterpart. Each of these
potentials could therefore play the exact same causal role that the LW
potential is called to play. What is more, since gauge potentials are
never observed independently of the electromagnetic eld-strengths, no
one can tell whether their parts that propagate at subluminal speeds are
40Op. cit.
41Op. cit.
42Equations (7) and (10).
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not there; nor whether they are.
With innitely many gauge potentials that behave like causally e¢ -
cacious objects do, it becomes impossible to choose "the one". Conse-
quently, if one subscribed to the reality of one of these potentials solely
because it admitted well behaved propagation at speed less than or equal
to that of light, one would have to subscribe to the reality of them all.
But then the unpalatable metaphysics of the literal interpretation re-
emerges, and along with it, its indeterminism. Let me clarify this last
point.
When viewed as objects with independent existence, each of those
uniquepotentials propagates deterministically. But at any given time,
or space-time point, only the elds are xed deterministically. Hence at
any given time we may pick any other from the potentials of the -
Lorenz family with 0 <  < 1. This is the kind of gauge freedom that
spoils determinism in the complete theory; and so it does here as well.
To conclude, being unable to single out a unique potential from the
innitely many of the -Lorenz gauge, subscribing to the reality of just
one is tantamount to subscribing to the reality of any other. This, in
turn, is as good as subscribing to the reality of them all.
4.2 Insurmountable obstacles
With the rst route leading to a slippery slope, if one insisted that
nevertheless there must be a way, the only route left open to one would
be the second. The second route starts with the assumption that all
electromagnetic e¤ects, including elds themselves, supervene on the
properties of unobservable potentials, but the aim is to narrow down
the number of real potentials to one, the LW potential. This unique
potential is still be unobservable. So, if all the reasons we can provide
for its uniqueness are the same as before, we are left, again, with innitely
many potentials to choose from: all the potentials of the -Lorenz gauge.
The second route seems to be barred from the beginning, unless we
can appeal to some characteristic of the LW potential that distinguishes
it from the other potentials of the -Lorenz gauge. Given the commit-
ment we are prepared to make, this would be appeal to the fact that it
is the only potential whose components propagate on the light-cone.
While on the rst route we could not appeal to this property of the
LW potential. Being committed to the reality of elds independently
of the reality of the potentials, the fact that some potentials appeared
to have more structure than the elds was not signicant. As long
as the properties of this additional structure were analogous to those
of observable causally e¢ cacious entities, and as long as they did not
alter the observables, it was impossible to decide whether this additional
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structure was there or not. Thus, we were bound to accept that all those
potentials could be perceived of as real.
On the second route, however, ones ontological loyalties lie with the
potentials. This comes handy, because we may now use the fact the
LW potential propagates on the light-cone. We could argue that if elec-
tromagnetic phenomena, in general, and light, in particular, supervene
on a single potential, this potential might as well be the only one that
propagates exactly like light. Of course this choice is not imposed by
physical or theoretical necessity. Rather, it is imposed by an argument
for metaphysical economy. Still, this argument could go, the choice in
this case is not as arbitrary as it would have been while on the rst
route; for, now we may assert that only the potential that behaves ex-
actly like light can represent the reality behind light itself. Therefore,
assuming that all electromagnetic phenomena transpire only as a result
of a unique potential, which, in addition, must propagate exactly like
those phenomena, we are able to narrow our options down to one: the
LW potential.
This kind of commitment comes at a price. If the idea that the LW
potential is the only reality behind electromagnetic phenomena is to be
sustained, the truncated theory that is based on this potential alone
should deliver the entire empirical content of electromagnetism as we
know it. This entails that everything of physical signicance, including
quantization and the empirical content of QED, must be derivable from
the LW potential alone. If it turned out that the truncated theory did
not deliver, and if appeal to other potentials was required, the very idea
that kept us going on the second route would be overthrown. In other
words, the idea that the LW potential is the unique reality behind all
electromagnetic e¤ects would turn out to be indefensible.
The rst response that comes to mind almost automatically is along
the following lines. If the entire physical and empirical content of elec-
tromagnetism can be gained from a truncated theory based on the LW
potential alone, chances are it can be retrieved from a truncated theory
based on any other gauge potential. In such case, electromagnetisms
gauge freedom and arbitrariness in choice of gauge remain, and along
come metaphysical ination and indeterminism. However, I would like
to leave this fair response aside and o¤er instead a di¤erent rejoinder.
I argue that the antecedent is blatantly false. That is, I argue that
the truncated theory based on the LW potential does not give back the
complete empirical content of electromagnetism, and this constitutes an
insurmountable obstacle indeed. Just one example su¢ ces to bring this
point home.
As it is well known, the Lorenz gauge condition (given by equation
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(1)) is satised automatically by Maxwells equations on the light-cone43.
This entails that, on the light-cone, we cannot use this condition as a
gauge-xing condition, because it does not eliminate all the unphysical
degrees of freedom that are associated with the gauge covariance of elec-
trodynamics. In order to eliminate the remaining gauge freedom on the
light-cone and proceed with quantization, a further xing of the gauge
is required. There is only one way we can achieve the required gauge
xing: by appeal to additional gauges and gauge-xing conditions. But
appealing to gauges other than the Lorenz is as good as accepting that
the empirical content of the truncated theory is inferior to the empirical
content of the complete theory.
It appears as thought the second route has led to a dilemma. On
the one hand we have committed to the LW potential as the only re-
ality underlying all electromagnetic phenomena; thus we have achieved
the metaphysical economy we strived for. But we cannot quantize the
truncated theory, and this means that the truncated theory leaves out
a great part of our observable world. On the other hand, if we appeal
to gauge potentials other than the LW and thus manage to quantize the
truncated theory we get that part of our world back. But appeal to
other potentials amounts to admitting that the idea which allowed us to
proceed on the second route is false: not all electromagnetic phenomena
supervene on the reality of the only potential that propagates like light.
Acknowledging what is at stake leaves no doubt as to what to keep and
what to let go. The full theory with its gauge freedom and its empirical
richness stays; the truncated theory with its metaphysical economy and
its empirical poverty goes.
To sum up, when the need to quantize electrodynamics arises, the
truncated theory provided by the LW potential proves to be both physi-
cally and empirically inferior to the full theory with its gauge covariance.
This goes to show that the last stronghold of those who would like to
press for the uniqueness and consequently the reality of the LW potential
falls. While on the second route, the only means to single out the LW
from the other potentials of the -Lorenz gauge leads to a truncated the-
ory which, although metaphysically parsimonious, is physically inferior
to the complete.
5 Concluding remarks
Electromagnetism is a theory with gauge freedom. Attempting a literal
interpretation of it goes down with an ination of metaphysics and inde-
terminism. Attempting an interpretation according to which the reality
43For this point I am indebted to Kelly Stelle.
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that underlies electromagnetic phenomena is a single, unique potential
is at least equally bad. The theory of electrodynamics proves not to be
conducive to such a move.
The upshot of the analysis in this paper is that once we commit to
the reality of one potential, we have to commit to the reality of innitely
many. Thus the toll one would have to pay is commitment to the same
kind (and quantity) of metaphysics that Aharonov and Bohm originally
subscribed to, and Mattingly tried to fend o¤.
None the less, the original hunch of Aharonov and Bohm, namely
that gauge potentials are physically signicant, turned out to be correct.
The success of gauge theories in high energy theoretical physics proves
it. An interpretation of this signicance is yet to be produced, and the
way that will take us there is yet to be discovered. My gut feeling,
however, is that an opening is bound to appear if (and possibly only if)
we go beyond the interpretive dilemmaI mentioned before. It need not
be "either theory of real elds and un-mediated action at a distance, or
theory of real potentials, and locality". It may as well be a theory of
elds, in which potentials play a role di¤erent from the one we usually
attribute to physical causal agents.
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